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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. 
EDWARD DON GREEN, : Case No. 990281-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
ARGUMENT 
ISSUE: GREEN'S ARGUMENT AS PRESENTED ON APPEAL WAS 
ADEQUATELY PRESERVED BELOW. 
The State contends on appeal that Appellant Edward Don Green 
("Green") makes an inadequately preserved "vagueness" argument in 
his opening brief ("A.B."). See State's Brief ("S.B.") at note 3. 
The State misconstrues Green's analysis on appeal and its 
preservation argument is, therefore, without merit. 
The portions of Green's brief that the State mischaracterizes 
as a vagueness argument are actually part of his analysis going 
toward whether there is a rational legislative distinction between 
the theft from a person statute, Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-404 (Supp. 
1998), 76-6-412(1) (a) (iv) (Supp. 1998), and the offense of theft of 
property valued at less than $300, Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-404, 76-
6-412(1) (d) . See S.B.n.3 (pinpointing A.B.8,11-13 as a "void-for-
vagueness" argument). Whether a rational legislative distinction 
exists is an analytical element that must be discussed when any 
claim under State v. Shondel, 453 P. 2d 146 (Utah 1969) is made. 
See State v. Kent, 945 P.2d 145, 147 (Utah App. 1997); State v. 
Clark, 632 P.2d 841, 843 (Utah 1981) (finding rational legislative 
distinction between crime of theft of livestock and general theft 
crimes classified according to value of property stolen); State v. 
Gomez, 722 P.2d 747, 750 (Utah 1986). 
Green acknowledges that he quotes Grayned v. City of Rockford, 
408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972), a void-for-vagueness case. See A.B.8 
(quoting Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108). However, he does so only to 
illustrate the contours of the due process and equal protection 
concerns underlying Shondel and its concomitant concern that 
legislative distinctions be reasonable, i.e. where a legislative 
distinction is not reasonable, "arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement" by the government may result. Id. Green's reference 
to Gravned in this manner is appropriate insofar as due process and 
equal protection vagueness concerns are at the heart of the Shondel 
rule. See A.B.8 (citing Kent, 945 P.2d at 147; Clark, 632 P.2d at 
844; State v. Gomez, 722 P.2d 747, 750 (Utah 1996); State v. Bryan, 
709 P.2d 257, 261 (Utah 1985) (other citations omitted)). Indeed, 
even the State acknowledges in its brief that Shondel is mandated 
by the due process and equal protection clauses of the Utah and 
U.S. constitutions. S.B.6-7 (citing Kent, 945 P.2d at 147; Clark, 
632 P.2d at 844). 
In any event, it is clear from the context of the overall 
argument that Green is not making a "void-for-vagueness" argument 
on appeal. The bulk of the argument at A.B. 11-13, which the State 
pinpoints as Green1s "vagueness" argument, provides discussion 
under the proposition that the "'from a person' language contained 
in section 76-6-412(1)(a)(iv) does not constitute a meaningful or 
2 
'significant' distinction." A.B.ll. Moreover, the term "vague" 
appears only once in the brief, see A.B.8; the phrase "void for 
vagueness" does not appear at all. 
As a final matter, the State's asserts that Green's 
"vagueness" argument is not preserved because it was made in a 
memorandum to the court filed after the court ruled on the Shondel 
issue. S.B.10 n.3. This argument is also without merit. As an 
initial matter, Green is not making a void-for-vagueness argument 
on appeal, and did not do so in the memorandum referred to by the 
State. R.48 (memorandum). Green is merely arguing that there is 
a "distinction without a difference," R.48, between theft from a 
person, Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-404, 76-6-412(1)(a)(iv), and theft 
of property valued less than $300, Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-404, 76-
6-412(1) (d) , a legitimate concern under his Shondel analysis. See 
supra. 
Furthermore, the memorandum, although filed after the hearing 
and the court's decision, was nonetheless presented for the court's 
consideration. R.48. The document is stamped "Filed Third 
District Court," indicating that it was received and, therefore, 
reviewed by the court. Id. Hence, the primary purpose for the 
preservation rule was served, namely that the lower court have an 
opportunity to consider the argument.1 See State v. Johnson, 821 
P. 2d 1150, 1161 (Utah 1991) ("primary reason[] for imposing waiver 
rules . . . is to assure that the trial court has the first 
1
 Green submits on his opening brief in response to the 
State's arguments which are not specifically addressed herein. 
3 
opportunity to address a claim that it erred. If the trial court 
already has had that opportunity, the justification for rigid 
waiver requirements is weakened considerably"). 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing, and for the reasons set forth in 
his opening brief, Green respectfully requests this Court to 
reverse his sentence and remand to the trial court. 
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